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THE EU DATA PROTECTION DIRECTIVE: IMPLEMENTING 
A WORLDWIDE DATA PROTECTION REGIME AND How 
THE U.S. POSITION HAS PROGRESSED 
INTRODUCTION 
In a world where e-commerce and information technology continue to 
increase exponentially in global pervasiveness, and arc high on the agenda of 
every notable and self-respecting corporation-whether large and seeking to 
maintain market share, or small and looking for rapid expansion-the prevailing 
conditions naturally amplify particular challenges that are inextricably linked to 
the expansion of such innovative business mediums. t Such large and accelerated 
growth is almost always closely followed by regulatory intervention of some 
description, as govemments attempt to identify an appropriate balance between 
the competing aims of entrepreneurial endeavor and consumer protection. In this 
regard, the juxtaposition of the universal commercially linked technological 
swell with an equally ubiquitous awareness and focus on individual privacy," 
inherent human rights, and corporate responsibility,' quickly leads to a 
discussion of the protcction of personal data. In a technology driven economy, 
I While it was prcyiously thc casc thatthc title of"ll1ultinational corporation" was rcservcd il)r only 
the largcst organi/ations \\ ith vast resources, holloll1less revcnue sourccs, and cmployecs spread copiously 
around the glohe, the intcrnet generation has enabled almost any company with cnough tcchnological sav vy to 
expand its operations to a host of countries using, almost cxclusi\c!y, online capahilities. S~~ Joseph .I. 
Laferrcra, Implicali!JIIs or the 1:'lIroIICall Ullioll Directil'c Oil Dala Proll'clio/l (Mar. 17, 20(5). 
h IIp:/!w\\,\\,. gesmcr.com!pu bl icati ons! i n tcrnat ionali9. ph p. 
2 This is particularly so in Europc. SI'I'. eg, Douglas v. Hello l Ltd., 1003 All E.R. 110 (2003), as 
one of many high prolile examples of cascs involving indiyidual rights to privacy, eycn in a celebrity context. 
3 See. e.g .. Nikc, Inc. v. Kasky, 539 U.S. 654 (2()(l:1) (dealing with the legal rclationship of corporate 
communications under the First Amcndmcnt, but highlighting thc currcnt climate of sensitivity betwcen 
corporate behavior and fundamental human rights). 
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where information can be rapidly aggregated, sorted, and analyzed for an array 
of commercial advantages, personal information may be tantamount to gold dust 
to companies of virtually every field. 4 Consequently, the race is on both to collect 
personal information and exploit it in the corporate quest to increase the ever-
sacred bottom line. Concurrently, the focus on protecting such information, for 
so long a peripheral aim in many countries, has been inevitably heightened; 
which in turn has led to the adoption of vast investigation and subsequent 
regulation in many countries. 
If it can be argued that the United States has been at the cutting edge of 
technological expansion in the commercial realm, the European Union ("EU") is 
undoubtedly advancing the cause of data protection through regulation; the 
perception of the efficacy and necessity of that regulation, however, can be 
debated. In October 1995, the European Community adopted "Directive 
95/46/EC on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of 
personal data and on the free movement of such data" (the "Direetive"),5 laying 
out a comprehensive harmonizing data privacy regime to be implemented by the 
EU's member states within three years.t> Although the primary goal of the 
Directive was to inculcate unity of data protection regulation among the states of 
4 Si!i! .lames M. Assey, .lr. & Demetrios A. Elctlheriou, The EU Us. Primer Sa/I! flur/J"r: Smooth 
Suiling or Trouhli!d Ilit/as:), 9 C()\lhlL~II' COt-;S1'1('II:S 145 (20() I) (discussing the growth of internet commerce 
and the background leading to the inception of the EU U.s. Safe Harbor Agrecment). 
5 Council Directive 95/46,EC. 19950..1. (L 2XI).11 [hereinatlcr Directive[. 
- (, Iii. art. .12. Article 249 of the E.l'. Treaty dictates that a Dircctil'e emanating hom the European 
Council "shall be binding, as to the result to be achicved, upon each I\lclllber State, to v.hich it is addressed. but 
shall leave to the national authorities the choice of /(lI'IllS and methods." IT T~b\l\' art. 249 (ex. I X9). Thus, 
although the principal aim of the Data Proli:ction Directive was harmonization of the laws among member states 
relating to the protection of personal data, in reality. the Directilc simply sets Illinimum ,tandards that mWit be 
met by till' statc~ in their national i1l1pkmclltation. As will be discus~cd, thi~ in it~clf has caused some concern 
regarding the efficacy of the hannoIliJ'atioll pr()cc~s . . "·cc LlIR()PI·:\'.,J ('{)i\11\11~:-:'[()'<, RI-P()RI I'R()\1 IH~ 
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the Union (then numbering fifteen),7 ccrtain provIsions contained within the 
Directive dealing with data transfers to countries outside of the EU have an 
absolute impact on the data protection policies of every nation that trades with an 
EU member. x In essence, the Directive prohibits transfers of personal data') from 
an EU member state to any non-member nation that does not engender an 
"adequate level ofprotection."lo Consequently, given that at the inception of the 
Directive no single nation in the world had a data protection framework even 
remotely close to that required by EU's mandate, such a requirement automati-
cally injected the international community with a dose of insecurity over its 
future trade potential with the EU. 
When considered in a broad global context, it is hard to avoid the feeling 
that the EU's implementation of sllch a wide sweeping regulatory exercise in the 
realm of fundamental human rights II goes too far by effectively creating a world-
wide data privacy regime utilizing the proverbial back door. Particularly in 
nations such as the United States, which have historically taken a fundamentally 
Cml~IISSI()"'. ("OM(03)265 tinal at II 12 I hcrcinatler FIRS I RIP()RTI. Nevertheless. even where a member state 
t~lils to adopt appropriatc national legislation within the time limit speciticd by a directive. thc provisions of the 
directivc, insofar as reasonably possiblc, will under certain circumstances have direct etTect (as distinct Ii'om 
direct applicability) on indiv'iduals wishing to usc the provisions of the directive in an action against the state, 
hlrthermore, citizens that have suttered loss as a result of the member state's bilure to implement a directiv'C 
may have a right of action j(lr damages against the state, For a general discussion of the direct clrect of 
directives on member states and their citizens. sec A.M, I\R'-'I'II II AI" Wnf1 & DASIIVV'()Oll's E11R()PHN 
UNION LA\\ X9 104 (4th cd, 2(00) Ihereinatler 1\i{1\1;[,[I, 
7 I\nd potentially the threc European Economic I\rca mcmber countries: Norway, Lichtenstein. and 
Iceland, 
X See Directive, .I111)m note 5, arts, 25 26, 
9 See id. art. 2ta) (de/ining "'personal data'" as '"any in/(mnation relating to an identified or identi-
fiable natural person'"), 
10 /11, art. 25, For a discussion of the parameters required by the Directive to meet the adequate 
protection threshold, sec il/ti-a Part II 1.1\. 
II See ill, art. I ( I ). 
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different approach on privacy regulation,'2 the EU's approach may have been 
hard to swallow. Knowing that no country, even the commercial powerhouse that 
is the United States, can afford to abrogate international trade with a commercial 
block as large (both geographically and economically) and potentially valuable 
as the EU,L' there is, in practical terms, very little choice other than to find a way 
to comply with the European regime. '4 Consequently, there is a generic feeling 
among those entities who collect and transfer data and those who necessarily 
keep a watchful eye on trade regulation, that the EU has instituted an unadul-
terated global policy for data protection, spreading its tentacles far beyond its 
own borders, and taking a sizeable bite out of the national sovereignty of every 
nation that wishes to deal with the EU. 
At least on their face, the EU's motivations for including the interna-
tional transfer restrictions seem legitimate,!:i The EU has alluded to the need for 
international compliance with equivalent protectionist policies for data 
protection, in order that the "high standards of data protection established by the 
Directive [not be] undermined, given the ease with which data can be moved 
I~ u.s. D[PAKI~II,~! 01 ('O\I:VII'l{( I, SAil IIAKIHlK W()RKBOOK, ami/ahfe al 
hltp://www.export.gO\/safcharbor.\hworkbook.html(last visikd Apr. 6, ~O()5) (discussing the sector-driven ad 
hoc approach to privacy regulation) [hereinafter SA[ I' HAIWOJ{ WORKIl()()K [. 
13 In 2002, Ihe lJnited Stale, had appl'Oximalely S37l) billion of Irade with the EU, including a 
significant portion of electronic COlllmerce, which ;.,ubstantially drivc~ cr()~~-bordcr tlow ..... of information 
regulated by the Directive's provisions. ,';ee iii. 
14 Se\'eral countrics have already emharkcd on a complete o\'crhaul of their respccti\c privacy 
regulations, including Australia, Argcntina, and Canada . ."iee James A. Harvey & Kimberley A. Verska, IV/iii I 
Ihe !:lImp"all Dala PrimeI' Ohligalio/lS MC({II /01' U.S BlIsille\,.\('\', hltp:/lw\\w.gigala\\.com:articies:2001-
aWhan'ey-2001-02-all.html (last visited Apr. 6, 20()5). As will be discLissed, however, evcn such directivc 
measurcs ha\'e not been entirely successful in placating the I:uropean regulatory juggernaut. See ill/i'(/ notes 
7X X I and accompanying text. 
15 S'ee 1).\1'\ PROIITTIO'\ I~ IIII' LtJIWI'I.AN UNI()'I 12, (/I'lIi/lIhie III http://curopa.eu.int/ 
COIllIll internal market:pri\'acy:docs:gui,bguide-ukingdolll en.pdfllast \ isitcd Apr. h, 20(5) [hereinafter D\IA 
PROf!{ 110'1[. 
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around international networks."16 While this assertion is hard to dispute from a 
realistie standpoint-partieularly considering the widely known difficulties of 
enforcing international "law" in any arena-it is equally difficult to submit to the 
concept that the regulation of personal data processing needs to be so broad and 
regimented in the first place. This is particularly evident when one considers that 
most countries appear to have been generally satisfied with their current regimes, 
whether regulatory or industry-based. As such, one is tempted to suggest that if 
the EU cannot effectively restrict the extraneous impact of its regulatory 
endeavors, perhaps it needs to avoid such complex and far-reaching regimes. As 
the EU should well understand in light of its own ongoing internal member state 
wrangling over issues of sovereignty,17 no country likes to feel the downward 
pressure of being dietated to concerning issues that may have significance in 
terms of a nation's ability to regulate its own affairs, ergo national sovereignty, 
simply by virtue of economic leverage. 
Despite the wide ranging enforcement capabilities that the Directive 
provides to the EU and its member states, there arc concerns that such measures 
may be unnecessarily attempting to hold back a tank with a pellet gun. The result 
of the EU's legislative exploits, in this complicated and extremely broad area, 
may be nothing more than increased compliance costs and additional red tape for 
corporations earnestly engaged in business on an international scale, while those 
16M 
17 For a general discussion of Ihc contlict betwccn I'LJ law suprcmacy and thc conscrvation of 
national "nereignty. sec AR'Jl'l I • .I'llI'm note 6. at I:; I (,X. 
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at whom the Directive is really aimed get lost among the tide of attempted 
enforcement. 
This paper looks at the background to the formation of the European data 
protection regime, its ostensibly limitless application, and the extent to which its 
ramifications indirectly regulate international trade and international data 
privacy policy, with a particular emphasis on the dealings between the United 
States and the EU. The United States as a whole has not been designated as a 
country providing blanket "adequate protection" through an existing or 
subsequently implemented privaey regime. On the other hand, there are only a 
few nations that have been afforded such status. However, the United States is 
the only nation to date to ciTeetively conduct negotiations with the EU and reach 
a satisfactory compromise regarding alternative methods of meeting, or at least 
circumventing, the strict requirements of article 25 governing third paI1y eross-
border information flows. For its trouble, the United States has been placed under 
the microscope of European Commission scrutiny in its ful fillment of the agreed 
obligations, perhaps, partially at least, in recognition of thc common perception 
that bringing the United States on board fully will eventually lead to closer 
compliance with the EU regime by other countries. 
BACKGROUND AND IMPLEMENTATION 
The ELJ has developed an almost sinister reputation for entering into 
regulatory pursuits that, despite generally genuine concerns underlying the 
conception of the endeavors,'~ often leave outsiders perplexed as to the EU's 
I X Otten regulations arc motivated by countries lobbying to protect what they sec ," something 
econOlnically beneticialto them that may be diluted without the impositioll of !()rlnal regulatiolls. Such was the 
160 
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justifications for its actions, causing speculation as to what the EU could possibly 
he dreaming about regulating next. Often, the EU is perceived, even by the 
citizens of its own member states, as a faceless bureaucratic institution that 
concerns itself with such matters such as how straight a banana should really be 
to be considered marketable, and whether chocolate of a certain constitution can 
really be called chocolate.ll) Such measures, although generally engendering 
legitimate concerns despite their facially absurd nature, have certainly not always 
been received with open arms as individual nations have struggled to maintain 
the balance of European solidarity with the often citizen-driven need to preserve 
at least some semblance of national sovereignty and independence. 
Moreover, such matters have at times thrown the EU into trade disputes 
with individual nations, including the United States. In addition, broad-sweeping 
EU-wide measures have at times violated or placed the EU in danger of 
violating211 its obligations under agreements with such international bodies as the 
WTO.21 The impetus for the imposition of the EU's data protection regime, 
however, was in keeping with two of the quintessential goals of the community: 
case with chocolate, with countries such as Belgium seeking to preserve the "purity" of the chocolate 
designation. Scc John T. Rourke & Mark A. Boyer, Whcl/ is II BIlI/III/" II BIlI/{II/{(J, http://highered.megraw-
hill.comisites i 00724X I 79x'studcnt viewO,ehapter71a further note 2.htl11l (last visited Apr. 6, 2(05). 
I R. 
19 St!t! Council Directive 20()()/36, 20()O 0..1. (L 197) 1925: scc IIlso Rourke & Boyer, slIpl'ilnote 
20 Press Release, Directorate (ieneral Trade of the European Commission, FU Welcomes 
Suspension of US Sanctions Following Re.solution of WTO Banana Dispute (July I, 20(1), {/\'l{illlhlt! III 
h t t p: i. eu ropa. cu. i nt/commit rade/m i t id ispu tei bana. ht mi. 
21 Sec Eric Shapiro, Note, .111 Is Nol F"ir ill liIe I'ril'llc\' Trlltie: The S"fi' II"rhor Igree/llclllllllti Iht! 
1""'1d limit! (hgllllbllioll, 71 FOIWII.\\I L. RI.I. 27XI (2003): see lIlso, e.g., \Vorld Trade Organization, FC 
C'lIilnl Stalt!s Accepl Rllggiero ('o/llpmlllise Oil BllIllIlIlI Displile (.Ian. 29, 1999), III http://www.wto.nrg 
ienglishine\\'s einews99 e/cbweb.htllll: Press Release, European Union, European COl11mission Takes Steps to 
Adapt Banana Import Regime to Enlargement (Mar. 5, 20()4), III http:·iwww.eurunion.orginewsipressi 
2()04.20040039.html: Aaron Lukas, )"s. /1" Sell So BIIIIIIIIIIS, III http://www.freetrade. org'pubs/articles i al-12-
2-9R.html (last visited Mar. 1(" 20(5). 
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(1) to promote an internal market consisting of absolute free trade between the 
members of the Community; and (2) to protect fundamental human rights on a 
variety of levels, particularly the right to individual privacy.22 
The Needfor Data Protectio/l Regulatio/l Harl1lolli::.atioll ill the EU 
Protection of personal data is nothing new in the European context. In 
1970, beginning with the German state of Hesse, European nations began to be 
cognizant of the potential for abuse of information privacy, particularly as 
technology continued to evolve. Consequently, many nations gained data 
protection momentum and began enacting regulations to combat what was 
perceived as a serious threat to individual liberties. This has consistently been 
one of the keystones of the Europcan Community foundation, and was equally 
present in many individual nations.23 Not surprisingly, as new and innovative 
protectionist methods were adopted in the EU's various member states, signif-
icant differences inevitably ensued. Implementation of these ad hoc national 
measures commonly included provisions regulating, or even prohibiting, 
transnational data tlows, where adequate protection of personal data was not 
existing or forthcoming. The disparity among nation states provided a conduit for 
high level discussion that eventually led to the drafting of the Directive and the 
22 See Directive, .IIII'm note 5, arl. I; .1('(' "Iso FIRSI RI'I'ORI, slI/'ra note 6, at 3 ("'Dircctive 95/46 
cnshrincs two ofthc oldest ambitions of the European integration project: the achie\'emcnt of an Internal Markct 
, and the protection of tillldamental rights and freedoills of indi\iduals, In the Directive, both objecti\es arc 
equally importanl."'), 
23 See gCl1crul/t' FinD H. CAIT, PRIVACY IN 1'111; 1:'-]1 OR!\l,\ liON A(,1· ( I l)97) (highlighting that hetween 
1970 and 1997 most Europcannations, including those not associated directly \\ith the COlllnlllnity. had cnaeted 
sOllle type of data protection policy or specific statutes); sce "lID Patrick .I, 1\lurray. ('()Jl1lllent. Th(' ,·ld(''III({Ci' 
Slwl(llIril U))iI"r /)ir('('li,'" IJ5/4fJ'I,'C Ooes US Oal({ Prole('!io)) .\le('{ This SI(/))ilarJ'. 21 h"w"'\~IINr'1 LJ, 
932.933 (19l)X) (citing CO"" .I. BI"'1I,IT, RU;lIL\II'I(; PRIIM\ 16 (1992)). 
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implementation of an overall policy aimcd at stabilizing the threat to the internal 
market of the Community. As one Commission report, studying the potential 
impact of the scparate regimes, suggested: 
l t]he diversity of national approachcs and thc lack of a 
system of protection at the Community level are an obstacle 
to completion of the internal market. If the fundamental 
rights of data subjccts, ill particular their right to privacy, arc 
not safeguarded at Community level, the cross bordcr flow 
of data might be impcdcd .... 24 
If the pcrception that led to the initial focus on data protection rights was 
accurate, namely a growth in technological sophistication providing simpler and 
more efficient methods of data collection, processing, and diverse usage, there 
seems little question that even the 1995 introduction of the Directive was before 
its time. Since the drafting of the Directive, there has been a veritable boom of 
technological expansion, with ever increasing numbers of consumers and 
businesses utilizing the internet as a primary source of operations, both retail and 
commerciap:i With the understanding that the internet was designed, and is 
commonly refcrred to, as the "information superhighway," it has also emerged as 
the ultimate source for the effortless collection of personal data, something that 
has been a boon to businesses, a legitimate but often misunderstood fear of 
consumers, and a pol itical nightmare for regulators. Indeed, any regular internet 
user will attest to the plethora of solicitations for personal information arising 
24 FIRS I RII'()R I . .I'llI'm note 6, at 1 (quoting COM(90)114 tlnal. at 4). 
25 See iii. at 4: see ({Iso 1'1 III RAI C()~I~Il:"I<'III()~ C()~I\IISSI()", !\1',III,IIlIIHY or !\[)\"I''CcLl 
Tf'LI(,()~"ll"ICIIi()"S ('\I',lllIIIIY I" 1111 U'Illlll SIIII'S, Fourth Report to Congress, {Il'{{il{{hl" {{t 
http>/\\\\'\\',ccp,ucia,edu'pages/internct-reporLasp (last visited Apr, (,. 20(5) (stating Ihat t(my-eight Illillion 
adults in the United States use high-speed internet access in the hOl1le), 
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there. It appears that such rapid technological advances highlight the need for 
protection from the violation of an individual's informational privacy. 
However, even heightened eognizance of the data protection challenges 
associated with the technological explosion does not automatically lead to easily 
managed solutions. Traditional means of legislating and regulating commercial 
behavior often seem ill equipped in the internet age, leading to attenuated 
applications of existing lawsCh and forcing lawmakers to stretch their imagina-
tions to mold statutory constructions to fit a seemingly ethereal global 
community, embracing often ephemcral tcchnologies and methods. Perhaps this 
was part of the impetus for the broad ranging agenda intended for implemen-
tation via the Direetive.n Several years after the promulgation of the Directive, 
the European Commission admitted that 
"data explosion" inevitably raises the question of whether 
legislation can fully cope with some of those challenges, 
especially traditional legislation, which has a limited 
geographical field of application, with physical frontiers, which 
the internet is rapidly rendering increasingly irrelevant. 2x 
The Commission itself is certainly aware of the difficult yet necessary task of 
identifying an appropriate balance between regulatory idealism and reality, and 
indeed is concerned about its own reputation, and the reputation of the 
26 SI!I!. eg .. Nike v. Kasky, 539 U.S. 654 (2003) (t()[cing the courts to apply traditional untilir 
bw,iness practice lalls to cOllllllunications widely proliferated through internet and other technologicalmcans 
tllr II hieh the laws were never intended). 
27 European Union materials suggest that although the Directive is "technologically neutral," the 
internet has specitically been considered as an important means of data transfer, particularly in relation to 
cOllntric~ that do not meet the criteria for providing adequate proteel ion. DAIA PRO I J:( II():--L ~upra note 15, at s. 
Thus, the tracking of internet users' personal int(lflllation through the l"e of cookies will come under the 
Directive, although if information is collected in a l110re visible way, the user may arguably have given consent 
to the collection of their int()l'Jl1ation. 1"-. see "I", ill/i,,, text accompanying note 45. 
2X FI~s 1 Rrl'OR I. SlIlil'l/ note 6, at 4. 
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Community as a whole, as it attempts to stabilize the efficacy of the Directivc. 29 
With all of this as a backdrop, on October 24, 1995 the European 
Parliament and Council enacted Directive 95/46/EC on the protection of 
individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free 
movement of such data.10 In addition to a lengthy preamble, the Directive listed 
as its primary objective the protection "of the fundamental rights and freedoms 
of natural persons ... with respect to the processing of personal data,"1l and, 
seeondari Iy, "the free flow of personal data between Member States .... "12 
Enactment (fnd Basic P/"(JI'isions of'the Directive 
MC/nber States were required to implement the terms of the Directive 
into their respective national laws within three years of the date of the 
enactment." Significantly, despite pre-existing data protection laws in almost 
every nation of the Union,1~ five members failed to implement appropriate 
measures by the 1998 cut off date, and in late 1999, the European Commission 
instituted actions in the European Court of Justice (ECJ) against France, 
29 .'icc ill/i-li tcxt accompanying note 74. 
30 Dircctivc, slIl,m note 5. The Dircctivc was later cxtendcd to bind the three additional members 
ofthc European Economic Area. See Decision 3X'I999 01'25 .Junc 1999, 19990..1. (L 296) 41. 
31 Jd. art. I (I). 
32 Jd. art. 1(2). 
33 Jd. art. 32. 
34 By 1995, only EU member states Italy and Cireece did not have any data protection legislation in 
place, and this situation was the catalyst Illr the most ditticulty in transferring data within the internal market. 
Since Italy and Greece were among the first tn implement the Directi\'C into national law. the hee flo\\' of 
information difficulties among member states were quickly vitiated, and there has apparently been no case to 
date of blocking data transfers between member states, something the Commission touts as a success regarding 
the imperatives of the Directive. FIKS I RII'ORI, slIjlm note 6, at 10. It will be intere;.ting to note whether this 
succe;.sful run continue;. in the post-aeec"ion era of ten new nations joining the EU earlier this year. 
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Germany, Ireland, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands.>s To date, however, all 
member states have at least some statutory based regime in place, although some 
states are still working on upgrading or fleshing out some of the intricacies. 36 
I. Basic prOl'isiolls o/'tIJe Directive. 
The Directive broadly covers all processlIlg of personal data ,7 by 
controllers3x or processors,3~ and anticipates thc formulation of precise defini-
tions of the conditions under which data can be processed by the member states 
in their national promulgation.ellJ Use of data regulated under the Directive 
includes both private and public sector controllers, and requires them to abide by 
certain rules in the use of that data. ell The general rules allowing the processing 
35 Press Release. Iluropean Union. Data Protection: Comllli"ion Takes Five Member Statcs to 
Court (Jan. II. 20(0). al http://europa . .;u.int'rapid'pre''RekasesAeti()n,do'!refcrence~1 PIOO, IO&format 
=HTML&aged= I &languagc=JlN&guiLangllage~en: see aflo FIRs I RIeI'()f{ I. SIIJlI'lI note 6. at 3 n, I, 
Commencement of the actions resulted in tllirly swill. bUl not immediate. resolution of the matters. Germany 
and France reported their enactments, but \\ ilh all ongoing plan to upgrade their existing data protection laws. 
and each of these ca~c:-. was clo~cd b~y the Comllli~~ioll. Ireland gave notice ora partIal cOlllpliance. but ha:-. yet 
to reach full concurrence. The action again:-.I Luxembourg weill through the FeJ. and led lo a cOllliclllllalion of 
Luxembourg t(lr tailure to fultill its EU obligations, See AI{JICl.l' 29 \VORKIM; PARIY. SI\ III A~NI; II D..\n 
PR() IHTION RIP<JI{ I. iII'ai/ah/1! al hltp://europa.cu,int/comm!intcrnal markel'privacy/uocs, wpdocs/2003, 2003-
6lh-annualreport en,pdf (last viSited Mar. 16. 20(5) [hereinaller SIX III A ""11,11 RI'I'ORI [, A complete status of 
the implementation of the Directile is available at hllp:!/europa,clI,int'commiinternal markel/privacy/law 
!implementation en.htm (last visited Apr. 6. 20(5). Set' a/so AR~t:II . .I'llI'm note !l anu accompanying tcxt 
(discussing the potential direct clfect of European uirectives), 
36 S(!(' S1.III,S OF 1~1!'IL~lFNIi\lI()N ()I [)IRIClIIT 95/46 ()N 1111. PROIH'II()N 01 INIlIVIJJUAIS \\ITII 
R[(;·IIW ro 111[, !'IW( I'SSI"<; 01 PI RSON!l1 DIIA. hllp:l/curopa,eu,inticolllm!internal Illarkel'privacy/law 
limpicmcnlation en,htm (last visited Apr. 6. 20(5), In addition. the ten countrie, lilat have recenlly acceded to 
the Union. as part of their "Copenhagen criteria" all cnacted uala protection legislation prior to the date of 
accession. FIRS I RU'ORI. SlIjJl'lI note 6. at 13. 
37 Directive. slII'ra note S. art. 2(b) (This provision in particular highlights the comprehensive. all-
encompassing. and potentially limitless nature of Ihe Directive's scope. uefining the "processing of personal 
data" as "any operation or set of operations which is performeu upon personal data. "hether or not by automatic 
means. such as collection, recording. organi/ation. storage. adaptation. or alteration. retrieval. consultation. usc 
disclosure by transmission. dissemination or otherwise making available. alignmcnt or combination. blocking. 
crasure or destruction"). 
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of data require controller or processor to: (a) process such data fairly and 
accurately; (b) collect data only for cxplicit and Icgitimate purposes and usc it 
accordingly; (c) collcct data accuratcly and kcep it up to date where necessary; 
(d) provide reasonable measures for data subjects to rectify, crase, or block 
inaccurate data stored about thcm; and (c) not keep data about any subjcct longer 
than is necessary.4" In addition, the Directive requires mcmber states to organize 
a supervisory authority, which, inter alia, must maintain a register of companies 
and individuals controlling data of specified types, and receive notifications from 
controllers enumerating its purposes and descriptions of proposed data 
processing.43 
Thc Directive also rcgulatcs when data can bc collccted and uscd. 44 Such 
occasIOns includc whcn: (a) the data subject has provided unambiguous 
consent;45 (b) the processmg IS necessary to the performance of a contract 
involving the data subject; (c) the processing is required by a legal obligation; (d) 
the processing is necessary to protect an interest that is essential to the data 
subject's life; or (c) the data controller has a legitimate interest in doing SO.4(, The 
42 III. art. ()(a) (d). 
43 Se(' id. arts. I ~ 21. 
44!d. art. 7. 
45 Note that although this requires that the data subject agree ""Ireely and specilically after being 
adequately infrmned" this docs not necessarily mean more than acquiescence after having received such notice, 
as can be implied Irom the usc of dilfering language in the provision relating to sensitive data. See DATA 
PROHTflOt-:. slIpra note 15. at 7: Cr Directive. slIpra note 5. art. R(2)(a) (requiring ""explicit consent" as 
opposed to ""unambiguous consent"). 
46 Directive. SlIlil'll note 5. art. 7(a) (I). The lin'll provision. although seemingly providing a catch-
all that in practice may be manipulated by unscrupulous data controllers is vitiated by the caveat that it must be 
in keeping with the ti.l1ldamental ti"eedollls alluded to in article I (I). \Vhat this means in real terms i, that data 
controllers arc responsible to validate with the supervisory processing of data that approaches grey areas. eyen 
though the ultimate arbiter of such rights. and the legitimacy of processing operations. will if necessary be 
determined by the courts. 
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Directive mandates even more stringent requirements to allow the processing of 
data considered "sensitive," that is, data dealing with racial or ethnic origin, 
political opinions, religious or philosophical beliefs, and data conceming health 
or sex life.47 
In keeping with the explicit purpose of upholding and advancing 
fundamental human rights, data subjects are afforded specific remedial opportu-
nities in case of grievances, subject to some necessary qualifications. For 
example, data subjects have the right to be informed when personal data is 
collected about thcm,-IX thc right to access personal data held about them;l'l the 
right to object to inaccurate data held about the subject, the right to object to 
certain uses of the subject's personal data,'iO and the right to access information 
conceming automated decisions made in relation to personal data. 51 Violations 
and complaints regarding the processing of an individual's data can be lodged 
with the national supervisory authority, which has a responsibility to investigate 
and effect remedial measures where necessary in response to such complaints. If 
no satisfactory result is achieved, an individual has recourse to the courts; or if 
the complaint is against the member state itself, complaints can be made directly 
to the Commission, which must take appropriate steps to settle the matter, 
including taking action in the European Court of Justice if necessary.52 
47 Id art. X. 
4X !d arb. I () I I. 
49!d art. 12. Bill sec iii. art. 13 (listing cxcmptions and restrictions on slich rights involving sllch 
clements as national security, defense, public security, criminal in\'cstigation~, alld other ~lIch cOIl~idcratiolls). 
168 
SO Id. art. 14. 
51 Id art. 15. 
52 DAIA PK()lIlI10" • . 11I1)/"{/ note 15. at 10 II. 
Issue 1 E. U. Data Protection 
Even by looking at this cursory overview of the essential clements of the 
regime, it can quickly be adduced that the boundaries of the Directive's 
application, far from being clearly defined, are potentially limitless in scope. As 
a consequence, there is little question that not only does the Directive burden 
almost anyone having any relation to business and commerce with the label of a 
"controller," by holding them responsible for abiding by the Directive's 
provisions; it is equally clear that there is virtually no chance that the European 
Commission or the national supervisory authorities, created by the Directive, 
have any viable chance of keeping up with the mandated enforcemenP3 
Therefore, the Commission and the national supervisory authorities must pick 
their battles accordingly.'i~ 
53 S('('. e.g, FIRST RIPORI, slIl,ra note 6, at 12 IJ. The COlllmission admitted that the "ubiquitous" 
nature of personal data makes it difficult to obtain accurate int(mnation about compliance with the law. Iii. at 
12. It did, however, submit that the evidence collated pointed to three specitie underlying issues regarding 
compliance and ent()reement: (a) supervisory authorities are under-resoureed and have such an array ofrespon-
sibilities as to shili cnf()rcement procedures down thc priority chain: (b) "patchy compliance" by data 
controllers that arc unwilling to amcnd thcir cxisting mcthod of operations to incorporate rules that arc 
"complex and burdensome" when the risk of being caught is so low: and (c) a low level of knowledge among 
data subjects, which may be part of the catalyst t()r part (b).!d. 
54 Onc example that gives somc insight into this observation is the direct selling industry. 
Companics that have operations in multi-level marketing, party-plan or other such methods of direct sales arc 
cssentially driven by hundreds of thousands of independent distributors, each of whom store int(mnation 
relating to his or her customers, ,md othcr related distributors (referred to as "downlinc" or "nctwork"). Undcr 
the remit of the Directive, each of these distributors must annually rcgister with the national supen isory 
authority by paying the standard fCc, and must meci all the other obligations under the provisions of their 
national laws, including notifying customers and other distributors that they arc storing their pcrsonal 
inf(mnation, and providing in/(mnation about the individual's rights pertaining to such in((mnation. Generally 
speaking, it cun be presumed that few such entrepreneurs will cvcr expcnd the time. em)rt, and resourccs to 
comply with the provisions, and it is even more unlikcly that they will evcr be challcnged on such non-
compliance. Other commcntators hav'C noted thatthc logical extensions of the Directive's requiremcnts, iftakcn 
litcrally, can impose "extraordinary" obligations. See. e.g., Lafcrrera, SIII'/'(/ note I. Lafcrrera provides the 
example of an employer who keeps a list of its cmployee's names and telephone extensions, noting thattechni-
cally it is processing data within the mcaning of the Directive and theret()rc must obtain consent of the 
employee, or notify the employee any lime Ihe int(lfI11alion is provided to a third parly. Id. There is some 
c\ idcncc to uclllon .... tratc thaI employers arc not hantically contactillg their lawyers to audit e\'ery t~lcct of their 
c01l1pallic~' data pnl(c:-,:-.ing, an apathy lilal may lead to Illore egregiolls examples of data protection violations: 
but pari of this generallelhargy f{Jr businesses meeting their data prolcction obligations may have been spurred 
by the extraordinary reach of the Direclive, and the tacit understanding that there is virtually no chance that 
national supervisory authorities could, even if they had the motivation, police or cnt()J'ce thc terms of the 
Directive to any substantial extent. 
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With this in mind, the results of research conducted by the Commission 
shed some light on some of the more interesting considerations that help to gauge 
public perception, and the efficacy of the Directive in making an impact on the 
personal data markets. For example, the Commission found that despite the 
Directive's requirement of apparently high standards of data privacy, 44% of 
survey respondents considered the standards as a minimum protection of their 
personal data rights. 55 Somewhat paradoxically, R I % of respondents also 
considered the level of awareness of individuals regarding data protection rights 
to be insufficient, bad, or very badY' The same investigation also revealed that 
although there was a general acceptance among busincsscs of the need for data 
protection rights,57 there seemed to be a general apathy towards fulfilling the 
obligations towards individuals when such data protection rights were 
exercised.5~ 
2. Tralls/ers olpersolla/ in/c)J"!l1{1lioll to "third cOlilltries "-article 25 hasics 
Undoubtedly, the most publicized, contentious, and onerous (at least 
from a non-EU nation perspective) provisions contained in the Directive are 
those that relate to the transfer of personal data to so-called "third countries." 59 
In essence, the Directive blocks all international transfers of data to countries 
55 FIRSI RIPORI, s"pra note 6. at 9. It is worth noting that the Commission is not to be considered 
'b reliable a, a ,cicnlitieally ,elected ,un e:,. but it reporled Ihe public l<lI'lUll kedback I(Jr what il i, worlh, and 
it is cOlllmitted to conuucting additional rc~carch into sllch n,:spoIlSC~ ill the future. It!. 
561d 
57 Id. (showing that almost 70% of businesses that participated in the survey concurred that data 
prolection regulation was lIecessary to society). 
58 Id. (highlighting that more than 60% of bu,ine,"es did not consider it an important function 
within their business to respond to relJuests for access to all individual's personal information. One suspects that 
this may be only part of the story). 
59 S('(' Directive. Slll'ril note 5, arts. 25 26.29. 
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outside of the EU, where the "third country docs not ensure an 'adequate level of 
protection' ."w Findings of adequacy arc made by the Commission, in consul-
tation with the Working Party established under article 29 of the Directive. 
Member States have an obligation to inform the Commission of countries that do 
not enshrine such adequate protection (although this seems redundant since 
transfers are not authorized on a blanket basis without the express approval of the 
Commission).1l1 At first blush, such a rule, particularly given the scope of the data 
encompassed by thc Directive, would seem to invite the wheels of commerce to 
come to a screeching halt. But as with any good rule, there are exceptions, and 
article 26 of the Directive contains several. 
The first set of "derogations" virtually mirror those provided for the 
collection of data generally, but of course these same parameters must be 
consistent with the international level at which such transfers will operate. So, for 
example, a transfer to a third country may take place on condition of 
unambiguous consent of the data subject, but the consent must no longer be just 
for the collection of the processing of the personal data, but for the specific 
transfer to a third country that may not provide parallel treatment of personal 
data. 1l2 Other standard derogations include those for the necessary performance 
of a contract involving thc data subject, transfers required by law, and transfers 
nccessary to protcct thc interests of the data subjccU" 
60 Ill. art. 25( I ). 
61 SI!I! ill. art. 25(2) (6). 
62!d. arl. 2(1( 1 )(a) 
63 !d. art. 26. 
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Other than these relatively straight-forward derogations, there is a "cover 
the bases type exception" that basically provides for transfers to be made to third 
countries not supplying nationally incorporated data protection where "adequate 
safeguards can be adduced 'with respect to the protection of the privacy and 
fundamental rights and freedoms of individuals '" ,"'h4 As will be discussed, this 
opens up several doors of opportunity for countries that have historically taken a 
more "sectoral" or self-regulating approach regarding data protection, allowing 
such countries to obviate the need for a complete legislative overhaul in thc field 
of data privacy, It is under this derogation that the United Statcs managed to 
carve out its own unique solution for thc continuance of fi'ec data sharing from 
EU entities to cel1ain qualifying entitics in the United Statcs,h5 It is also the 
derogation provision that incited the Commission, with appropriate consultation, 
to craft and adopt standard contractual clauses that can be uti lized by entities 
wishing to transfer data intcrnationally in order to fulfill the adequate safeguards 
required by the derogation,f>(, 
III. INTERNATIONAL TRANSFERS~RE(JULArION, ENFORCEMENT, AND 
('[Rl'lJMVENT[ON 
The General Adeqll(/cy Reqllirement/hr Third COlll1{rV 7hllls/ers 
Pursuant to article 25 of the Directive, member states must ensure that 
transfers of personal data must take place only after a determination has been 
64 Id. al'l. 26( 2>-
65 Sec ill!;-(/ text accompanying section C. 
66 Commission Dccision2001!497. 20010..1. (L Igl) 19. 
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made that the intended nation of the recipient provides "adequate proteetion."67 
However, the Directive (or, for that matter, other prior or subsequent Community 
documents) docs not provide much guidance on how adequacy is to be defined 
or determined, other than to state that it should be "assessed in the light of all the 
circumstances surrounding the data transfer" on a case-by-case basis. 6X Of 
course, one significant departure from this is enshrined in article 26(2), and 
allows member states to authorize a transfer or set of transfers to a third country 
not engendering adequate protection across the board where the controller 
"adduces adequate safeguards" with respect to the fundamental aims of the 
DirectiveY) This trickle-down right and responsibility of the member states 
would seem to provide the necessary flexibility to avoid over-encumbrance of 
intemational transactions in respect of data privacy requirements where the third 
country as a whole lacks adequate protection, particularly given the minute 
number of nations adjudged to meet the national requirement. However, the 
Commission has highlighted concerns over the divergence in member state 
implementation,70 and the threat this poses to the aims of the Directive. 71 
67 Direclive, IlIfJro note 5, art. 2S( I). A finding of adequacy may bc determined based on the 
domestic law of the cOllntry seeking to gain such a designation or on international commitments entered into 
with the Commission. such as is the case with the Safe Harbor Agreemcnt between the EU and U.S. S"" il1/m 
Section C. 
6X For a comprehcnsive ovcrvicw and discussion of the operations and ramifications of the 
adequacy requirement, see Murray, 11I1!m note 23. 
69 Directive, 11I1!m nole 5, art. 26(2): "'(' ,,/10 iii. art. I( I). 
70 SI!(, FIRSI RI'I'ORI. 11I1!m note 6, at IX. 
71 See D\IA PR()[I-l IIO\J, 11I1!m note IS, at 12 (articulating the primary fear of the Commission that 
without consistent application in international transfers of the high standards of data protection adopted in the 
Directive. the purpose of those standards would be quickly undermined givcn thc pace at which data transfers 
can pervade international networks). 
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The Commission noted, for example, that some member states filtered 
the adequacy determination down to the controllers themselves with very limited 
control or input from thc supervisory authority. This naturally has the effect of 
diluting the standard of the adequacy determinations and falling short of the 
article 25 obligations, even if controllers act in a purely legitimate or innocuous 
fashion.7 2 On the other hand, some member states have taken the micro-
management approach of requiring all data transfers to third countries to pass an 
administrative approval process, including transfers to countries and controllers 
already determined by the Commission to meet blanket adcquacy protection. 73 
The Commission has found this approach to be both onerous and unnecessary in 
its logistical application and equally inconsistent with the Directive's mandate to 
protect flows of data without unnecessary burdens. 74 
1. Findings aj'national adequa(y to date 
Under the Directive, the Commission was imbued with the power to 
determine, in accordance with article 25(5), that a country possesses a regime of 
data privacy that ensures adequate protection regardless of the identity of the 
controller.75 The consequence of such a decision is that data transfers can occur 
between anyone of the twenty-five member states and the three European 
72 FlRo T RHOR I • .IIII'm notc 6. at I K. 
73 Id. 
74 lei. (stating that "[aln overly lax attitude in somc MCll1bcr Statcs in addition to bcing in contra-
vention of thc Dircctivc risks weakcning protection in the EU as a whole. becausc with the ti"ee movement 
guarantced by the Directive. data flows arc likely to switch to the' least burdensome' point of export. An overly 
strict approach. on the other hand. would tail to respect thc legitimate needs of international trade and the reality 
of global telecomll1unications networks ... which is damaging t(>r the credibility of the Directive and fix 
Comll1unity law in gcncraL"). 
75 Cm,IMlssIO'J DI(ISIO'JS ON Jill AIlI()IIAl"V (JI 1111·. PIWIITIIO'J ()I PJRSO'JAI D.HA I~ THIRIl 
COli:': IRIIS. http:/europa.eu.inticomm'intcrnal market 'privacy/adequacy cn.htm (last \ isitcd Mar. 20. 2()OS) 
[hercinatler [XlISI();'S ()'J Aill (.HI.\( \ I. 
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Economic Area members, without any necessity for additional safeguards. In the 
post-Directive era, several countries have completed radical overhauls of their 
data privacy policies, some for the direct purpose of falling into line with the 
Directive's adequacy requirements. However, it remains that very few countries 
have so far qualified for an adequacy finding by the Commission.7(, To date, the 
Commission has issued decisions verifying the adequacy of protection in only 
Switzerland (in 2000), Canada (in 20(1), Guernsey (in 20(3), Argentina (also in 
2(03), and the I sle of Man (in 2(04).77 
Other countries have tried and failed to satisfy the requirements that the 
EU is apparently looking for before assigning an adequacy label. For example, 
Australia implemented its Privacy Amendment (Private Sector) Act in 2000, at 
least partially in response to the Directive, to bring Australia's data protection 
regime into line with the requirements7~ and simplify the transfer process 
between Australian companies and their European trading partners.79 The EU 
Commission rejected the comprehensive privacy law as inadequate, much to the 
chagrin of Australia's Attorney-General, who vehemently disagreed and 
lambasted the European Union for not getting its own house in order and not 
recognizing or understanding the extent or et1icacy of the privacy regime. XII The 
76 See iii. 
77M 
]X See Harvey & Verska, SII/!!"II note 14. 
79 Sce Attorney-General Daryl Williams, Film/willi DII/II "m/ce/ioll COllllllissiO//i'r \. OpillilJll or 
Alls/ra/ill \. Pril'llC!' 1.(/1\', http://www.ag.gov.au/www/attorneygeneraIHome.nsfinXC9464056(.ERI69(.(·A256 
85AOO 131 XDF'Opcn[)oelll11cnt (last visited Apr. 6, 20(5). 
XO See id.: see II/SO SIXIII Ar-;Nl:i\1 RI·I'ORI. sllpra note 35, at 22 (discussing thc reasons advised by 
thc Articlc 29 Working Party. adhcrcd to by the Commission, tlll' a negative adequacy finding against Australia). 
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Attorney-General lauded Australia's legislation, remarking that although the 
Australian government would continue to work with EC officials to resolve the 
issue, it would not impose restrictions and requirements that unnecessarily 
burden businesses. x 1 
It is not unreasonable to extrapolate from the current position regarding 
adequacy findings by the Commission that the EU may have set the bar too high, 
and as a consequence nations arc finding it difficult to install a framework that 
fits their own legislative policies and theories while meeting the EU's projected 
requirements. Of course, one additional explanation, and one that is not without 
merit, is that many nations and entities within those nations simply do not 
understand what the EU is requiring them to do. x2 Either way, it is quite possible 
that what the EU is looking for is not in fact adequacy of national privacy laws, 
but is instead equim/ellce of national privacy laws. In that respect, given that no 
independent country can realistically afford to entirely forego international trade 
with the EU and its members, it is feasible to suggest that the EU's Directive goes 
beyond the regulation of its own borders and is in reality tantamount to 
introducing a worldwide privacy regime through the baekdoor. 
Nevertheless, there arc available arrangements other than simply finding 
a way to weave national legislative policies into the EU's adequacy standard. 
Most notable among those, and one of the most widely discussed and monitored 
S I Williams, .1'111'/'(/ note 79. 
X2 AIIsl/'(//iall CO/llpallin Lillgeil' igllo/'(/1I1 of f:'{j Dala Prol(!cliOIl L(/\\'s, PRIVACyExCH""(;F.(lR(;, 
Mar. 22. 200 I. (/1 hllp:; .. www.privacyexchangc.org/news/archivcs/gpd/globde\OI06.htm\: SI!I! aiso Murray, 
.1'111'/'(/ note 23 (describing in de(ail (he difticulties and intricacies associated with (he l'U's adequacy standard, 
including a misunderstanding of the requircments by third countries and differing opinions \\ithin the EU). 
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results of the Directive to date, is the U.S. Safe Harbor Agreement,x' which has 
the general purpose of allowing U.S. eompanies to self-certify to specific privacy 
policies, thus obviating the need for an adequacy determination (for which the 
United States certainly does not qualify), but fulfilling the identical purpose for 
those companies that register for the program.X4 
Standard Contracllial Cla/lses-an Additional Option fc)r Compliance 
In addition to the two categories of general provisions allowing 
continuity of international transfers, the EU has also created a non-exclusive set 
of standard contractual clauses that can bc negotiated in individual contracts for 
transactions that involve personal data transfersY' The standard clauses are 
simply intended to be one additional option for controllers to qualify for transfers 
of personal data to third countries under the Directive and ostensibly have no 
impact on the adequacy decisions of the Commission. Entities wishing to transfer 
such data can still rely on contracts already drafted and approved by national 
supervisory authorities, but only under rare and specified circumstances will a 
X3 Sec Die ISIO"S ON AIlH)II,'I(Y. slIl,m notc 75 (providing Safe Harbor Agrccmcnt decisions. 
overvicws. and documcnts); scc IIlso U.S. Dl-I'AR r~tt.r-. I 01· COM~1FR(,E. SArE HARIlOR. 
http://\\\V\v.c'(port.gov/safeharbor/ (Ias( visited Apr. 6. 20(5). 
X4!d Also worthy ofnotc. but not discussed in detail within thc scopc (lfthis papcr is the agrecment 
bctwccn thc Europcan Community and thc Unitcd States. pursuant to a Commission adcquacy tinding. on thc 
proccssing and transfer of air passengcr name records (PNR). which gcnerally makes it allowablc for airlincs 
opcrating out of the IOU to transfer passcngcr data to the U.s. Dcpartmcnt of Homcland Sccurity to support 
national sccurity mcasures in the wake of the') II disastcr. Scc id: Press Releasc. Europcan Commission. 
Intcrnational Agreemcnt on Passcnger Name Records (PNR) linters Into Force (May 2X. 20(4). III 
h tlp:/ / europa.cu. i nt/rapid/ pressRe leasesAct ion .do"rcference= I P /()4!6,)4& format= HTM L&agcd=O&languagc=c 
n&guiLanguage=en: SCI' IIlso Prcss Rclease. U.S. Dcpartment of State. U.S .• EU Agree On Air 
Passenger Data Transfer (Dcc. 16. 20(3), III http://w\\.w.useu.be/Terrorism!USRcsponseiDcc 1603 PN R 
Agrecmcnt.html. 
X5 Sce gCl1cralh· !:t:lwrIA"-: C{)\1~IISSI0". MOIlI I CO" iRA( TS lOR I IIF TRANSII-R Oi PcRS{)"AI DAIA 
To THIRD COI:CJ I RIIS. !II http://europa.cu.inticoml11/internal market/priv-acy/modclcontraets en.htm (last 
visited Apr. 6. 2()())) (providing documcnts dcaling with the drafting, discussion. adoption. notitlcation. and 
frcqucntly askcd questions rcgarding thc Commission's standard contractual clauscs j(,r thc transfer ofpcrs()nal 
data to third countries). 
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supervisory authority have the capacity to block transfers that seek to make use 
of the Commission's clauses.xl> 
Notwithstanding thc additional options for flexibility and compliance 
that the standard clauses provide, particularly for a business that does not wish to 
undergo a full scale investigation and revamp of its privacy policy, the plan has 
met with mixed reactions by commentators and practitioners. x7 Some have 
applauded the policy for handing businesses an option allowing them to stay out 
of official programs such as thc Safe Harbor. xx Meanwhile, others have cautioned 
against the inextricable, onerous, and perhaps unacceptable business implica-
tions that come with use of the standard clauses, such as the inclusion of data 
subjects as third party beneficiaries of contracts (which has varying ramifications 
according to local contractual principles),Xl) which makes data importers subject 
to audit by a supervisory authority and possible restriction in the choice of 
applicable law and court jurisdiction.9() 
This brief overview of the basic parameters and alternatives for 
continued transfers under the Directive of personal data to third countries 
naturally leads to the issue of the U.S. response, particularly in light of the 
immense scale of trade between the United States and the EU.91 
~6 s~~ id (discussing allowablc blockagcs of transtl:rs using the standard contractual clauses under 
circumstances such as where the clauses are not res peeled by thc importing controller or processor. or constitute 
a grave risk of harm to data subjects). 
g7 Se(' Alexander Zinser. The fllm!,"'"1 CO/lllllisl'/OIl /)('cisioll Oil Slalldllld Clalls(,1 Ii,,' Ihe T/'{/I/Sjer 
o/Per.\()lIal Da/(ilo Third ('olllllries: .111 f''f/~('li\'~ SOllllioll:). 3.1. INIIII. PIWI'. 2-1 (2003) . 
. XX S~~ gelleralll' illl;'a notes 92 III and accompanying text. 
Xl) Zinser. SIIJJI'(/ note X7. at 32 3'>. 
90 Se~ Ill.: see also Stephen II. LaCount et al.. L'lIm!,~"" Cllioll /)al" Pmlcelioll f)ir~('li\'e (llId c.s. 
Sali' Harho}" All t;llI!'lm'('/' UJ/(I(/I~ (Sept. 7. 2()04). (/1 http://www.nix(\npeabody.comlinked media publica-
tions PncyAlcrt 0907200-l.pdf 
Y I ,-)'(1(, supra note 13 and accompanying text. 
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The EU-U.S. Safe Harhor Agreement, its Implemelltation, Etfica(]', and 
Progression 
1. Backgrollnd to Us. data primc.\' 
While the European perspective on personal data has been geared 
towards comprehensive public intervention, with priority exclusively preserved 
for individual rights, the U.S. has consistently preferred a market-based or self-
regulatory approach that has developed into what the Departmcnt of Commerce 
has described as "sectoral," with legislative solutions forthcoming to govem 
more sensitive areas of personal data transactions.92 There are certainly plenty of 
pros and cons associated with the differing theories. From the pcrspective of 
advocates of the European doctrine, the U.S. approach leaves too much to chance 
in the realm of fundamental human rights, leaving individuals uninformed and 
overexposed to the insidious acts of more sophisticated parties.9] From the U.S. 
standpoint, the sectoral approach may allow for a higher level of information 
flow, based firmly on First Amendment grounds, thus imbuing citizens with 
"significant economic and social benefits," in addition to reinforcing a "healthy 
distrust for goveml11ental solutions, preferring instead rcliance upon entrepre-
neurial and market hased proteetions."94 There is little doubt that such founda-
92 See SoYII' H \1~Il()R W()R~Il()()~. Stll)/'({ note 12: see "/1'0 Assey & l'IcHheriou. SIll'/'({ note 4. at 
149 50 (discussing the U,S, approach that predominantly incorporatcs industry norms. codes of conduct. and 
the consumer markctplace. and ft1ClISes only secondarily on legislative measures targeted towards specific 
sectors of the economy): see "/,,, l"lIance of Safe liarbor Principles and Transmissions to Furopean 
Commission. 65 Fed, Reg, 4566(), 45666 67 (July 24. 2(00) (stating thaI, "Iwlhilc the United States and 
European Union share the goal of enhancing privacy protection ft)r their citizens. the United States takes a 
ditferent approach to privacy trom that takcn by the I'uropean Union, The United States uses a sectoral 
approach that relics on a mix of Icgislation. regulation. and selt~regulatiot1,") Ihereinatier SAH HARHOR 
PRt"CIPIl'sl, 
93 Asscy & Eletiheriou. ,I'llI'm note 4. at 149 50, 
94 M at ISO, 
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tional philosophical differences, at least in part, are sufficient to prevent any type 
of general adequacy finding by the Commission regarding the United States as a 
nation. 
Notwithstanding these obvious difTerences, both the EU and the United 
States were highly cognizant of the significant amount ofcol11merce between the 
two trading blocks that could potentially be afTected by the provisions of the 
Directive and the interests of both parties that were at stake. Consequently, the 
EU and the U.S. Depmtment of Commerce entered into negotiations to layout a 
framework that would provide the requisite "adequacy" under the Directive on 
an individual-company or public-entity level, without the need for wholesale 
changes to current U.S. data privacy laws. 
2. The Sale Harhor Agreementji'wllcl1'ork-hasic principlcs 
Following intense and protracted negotiations between the EU and the 
United States,Y5 on July 24, 2000, the Department of Commerce finally 
issued%-and the EU promptly accepted'!7-the principles of the so-called Safe 
Harbor Agreement, heralding the beginning of a new era in LJ .S. personal data 
protection. The basic thrust of the Safe Harbor Agreement (SHA) and its 
principles is to provide U.S. organizations with an etTective and straightforward 
means of transposing the Directive's data protection requirements into their 
95 S"" David A. Castor. lin/(Iillg Hilla ill IIIl' nala Prime)' Age All Allail'sis o(111l' Sa!e I!"r/Jor \ 
Finl l""r, 12 I"D. len 'L & COMP. L. RI\'. 265, 275 76 (2002) (highlighting thc fundamcntal di"lgrccmcnt 
betwcen thc partics rcgarding thc bcst way to procecd, thc request of thc IOU that the U.S. implemcnt federal 
legislation govcrning the usc of pcrsonal data by cOlllmercial entities, and the EU's rejection of live separatc 
proposals by the U.S. bct()rc rcaching an agrcemcnt). 
96 S\lI' H \RIl()K PRIr-:cIPI I'S, \'/IIi/'" note 92. 
97 Commission Decision 200()l520, 2000 0..1. (L 21) 5, 7. 
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operations, thereby avoiding any concerns for both them and their EU data 
exporters that they will be found in violation by the EU and consequently be 
subject to enforcement under the Directive.9x There are of course some important 
limitations in the fields of national security, public interest, conflicts with 
existing U.S. law, and other similarly bona fide departures.'!'! The SHA is a purely 
voluntary scheme, but those organizations that decide to take advantage of its 
provisions are encouraged to "implement the principles fully and transparently," 
and apply the principles to all data processing and transfers following registration 
in the seheme. loo 
The substance of the SHA is embodied in the seven basic principles 
which Safe Harbor registered organizations must entrench into their policies and 
procedures. The principles are: notice, choice, onward transfer, security, data 
integrity, access, and enforcement. Furthermore, organizations must self·certify 
annually to qualify for the ongoing benefits of the program. 101 
Notice. The notice requirement requires organizations to inform 
individuals about the purposes for which information is being collected, provide 
contact details for the organization to facilitate complaints by data subjects, 
inform subjects of any third party use of the data, and make available the means 
to communicate to the organization choices regarding the use of the data. Notice 
must be clear and conspicuous, and must be provided on the front end of any data 
9R SMF IhRIlOI( PRINCIPII s. slIl'm note 92. at 45666 (,7. 
99 Iii. al 45(,6(,. 
100 Id. 
101 For a list (lfthc rcgistration rcquirclllcnts. scc U.S. DIPARr~ll"r OF CO~IMFR(T. l'JI'()R~IATIOi\ 
RH)I.IRF[) lOR SAl I, llARIlOI( CI'R I III(.\IIO'J. al hllp: '\\Ww.cxporl.govisafcharbor/sh rcgistration.htllli (last 
visitcd Mar. 20. 20(15). 
181 
INTERNATIONAL LAW & MANAGEMENT REVIEW Spring 2005 
transaction whcre reasonably practicable. Failing that, it must be provided as 
soon as possible thereafter. 102 
Choice. Under the choice princip\c, organizations must provide 
individuals with an opportunity to "opt out" from disclosure of their information 
to third parties or other data uses that are incompatible with the original purposes 
for which the data is collected. To facilitate this option, organizations must 
provide to individuals clear and readily available information and mechanisms. 
More stringent requirements apply to the processing of "sensitive data" as 
defined by the Directive, requiring a conscious "opt in" facility. ml 
Onward transleJ: Onward transfer of data may only occur where the 
notice and choice provisions are adhered to. Most importantly, however, for the 
successful operation of the SHA, such transfers may only be made where that 
party is also registered under the SHA or is otherwise in compliance with a 
commensurate level of data protection, such as a written agreement binding the 
party to the SHA principles for that spccific transaction. III,) 
Security. Processors of personal data under the SHA must take 
reasonable steps to prevent personal data collected and used from "loss, misuse, 
and unauthorized access, disclosure, alteration, and destruction."11I5 
Data integrity. In accordance with the Directive, the SHA requires that 
personal data should be relevant for the purposes for whieh it is collected, must 
182 
102 SAri' H.\RBOR PRIMIPI IS, .1{fIJru note 92, at 45667. 
103 Id. at 45667-68. 
104 Id. at 45(,68. 
lOS Id. 
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be used in aecordance with the purposes for whieh it was eollected, and should 
be initially authorized by the individual. Consistent with this, SHA organizations 
arc required to ensure that the information is reliable, accurate, complete, and 
current insofar as necessary for the purposes of its intended usc. lOr, 
Access. The access requirement is closely linked to the data integrity 
requirement. Pursuant to the requirement, individuals must be granted access to 
the infonnation that an organization holds about them, and must be endowed 
with the ability to delete, correct, or amend such data, provided that the expense 
of maintaining such an operation is not unreasonably disproportionate to the 
rights of the individual and does not affect the rights of persons other than the 
individual. lo7 
Enlorcement. Enforcement contemplates the usc of mechanisms, both 
public and private, to ensure compliance by those participating in the SHA. Not 
only must organizations annually certify, but the SHA anticipates use of federal 
and state law to enforce obligations, as well as the availability, designated by the 
organization, of an independent resolution body to handle disputes that are 
unresolved between the organization and the individual. IIiX 
Clearly, even these basic principles raise many questions regarding 
procedure, policy, and to what extent U.S. organizations will actually benefit by 
106 !d. 
107 Iii. 
108 Iii. The Federal Register cntry enumcrating these principles also provides a usctiil FAQ section, 
commentary. and assessmcnts, which provide a more detailed analysis of the principles, their anticipated 
promulgalion, derogations, concerns, and benelits . .'leI' id. at 4566~ RS. One additional point that should be 
made is that organizations may cordon oIl scctors of their data privacy operations to mcct the SHA, for example 
in the context of human resources records. which may be far more manageable in the SHA context than a 
complete organintion-wide overhaul. 
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signing up to a schcme that incorporates principles unfamiliar to many organiza-
tions and forces them to make significant changes in their information systems, 
the education of their workforce, and perhaps even their technological capabil-
ities. 11I9 Not surprisingly then, the SHA has had, and continues to have, its critics. 
Some argue that compliance with its principles is too costly, unfair, and 
unmanageable, an argument concurrent with finger-pointing at alleged EU 
hypocrisy by not putting its own house in order before seeking to expand its 
jurisdictional power in the data privacy field far beyond its own borders. I III With 
that said, the SHA has been gaining momentum as organizations have leamed of 
its benefits, recognizing it as simply one means of ensuring unfettered continu-
ation of personal data transfers from EU-based entities to their U.S. counter-
parts-certainly not the most appropriate approach for everyone, and certainly 
not without its flaws in conception or implementation. I I I 
3. IlIIplelllell/a{ioll ([lid progress of the SlIA-w/ ollgoillg ulld illlPcr/ect {ellure 
Given the SHA's unique status among the responses to the EU's 
Directive, and no doubt due to the size and economic power of the U.S., the EU 
has been dedicated to ongoing scrutiny of the SHA's implementation and 
efficacy. Combining this paradigm with the EU's apparent paranoia I 12 about its 
109 For a general discussion of the benetits and costs of signing onto the scheme, sec i\ssey & 
Eletlheriou, slIpra note 4, at 156. The article also contains a useful discussion of what an organization should 
consider when deciding whether to enroll in the program. and if so. what steps I11Ust be taken at a foundational 
!eycl to commence the transition to compliance with the principles. It!. at 156 5X; see a/so Castor, .1'111'1'([ note 
95, at 279 X6 (analyzing costs and benetits ofthe SHi\. both actual and contemplated). 
II () Asscy & I'Idlhcriou . .1'111"'(/ note 4, at ISX. 
III 5;<,<, gel/('/'al/r El,J{(JPL~~ CmlMISSIOI'i, Cml~lISSI0N S IAII WOKKIN(; D()('ll~lI'" I, SEC (2004) 
1323, [hereinatler SIAl! WOHKIN(; DOClI~II"II; see al,,, '/1\" DIIONI 1·1 ·\1 .. S.\lI· HAHIlOK DI'l'ISIOl'i 
hll'll'II"I"II()" SillilY (2004) Ihereinalkr 1\11'11'11 NL\II()'J SillilY I. 
112 See SlIfil'([ note 74 and accompanying texl. 
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reputation resulting from its indirect attempt to take the Directive around the 
world, it is easy to understand why the EU is so adamant that the program be 
carefully monitored, and that improvement and support in and f)'om the U.S. is 
forthcoming. Earlier this year, as part of its ongoing investigation of the 
implementation of the SHA, the Commission requested a joint study be made 
involving the knowledge and experience of scholars from the EU, European 
Economic Area, and the United States. I 1.1 This study was followed by the recent 
release of the Commission's second report pertaining to the "implementation of 
Commission Decision 520/2000/EC on the adequate protection of personal data 
provided by the Safe Harbor Privacy Principles and related Frequently Asked 
Questions issued by the US Department of Commerce."114 
The attraction of organizations to the SHA has been far from numerically 
impressive in its initial years.II" A number of reasons have been cited for this, 
including for instance: companies arc reticent to make legal commitments that 
may lead to liability in the United States for the purpose of satisfying eontemp-
tuously perceived European rights problems; organizations lack understanding of 
the SHA, its requirements, and purposes; and, given the apparent lack of the 
wide-scale enforcement organizations and measures, they choose to "lay low" 
until such time as they r('a/~r have to take steps to eome above board.llC, 
113 1\11'11-,\/1,/\ 1""0/\ S, L'Il\, . .III/1m note III. 
114SIAII WORKIJ\(;[)OCL'Mrl\'.SlIpmnote III, 
115 SCI! Castor . .IIII'm note 95. at 2XO (pointing out that only 124 U.S. companies had signed up Illr 
the sehcme by the end of the first year. many of thcm small and mcdium-sized businesses); S L\IT WORKI/\(; 
DOll'\lr/\] . .IIII'm note III. at 5 (discussing the continued growth of SHA rcgistration each year and the 
increased protection cnsuing tiuIll thcse registrations. but expressing disappointment at thc overall number. 
w hieh is less than initially anticipated. and hoping that thc recommendations of the report will Icad to grcatcr 
pcrvasi\'cness of certifications in the tllturc), 
II (, Sec LatCrrera . .III/1m note I. ;\"cy & Elctlherioll . .III/Ira note 4. at 156 5X; ,ICC ,,/,10 Harvey & 
Vcrska . .IIII'm note 14, 
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Furthermore, other organizations may have avoided embarking on broad 
upgrades to their teehnology and human resources facilities to meet an under-
enforced standard that they know they may not be able to adequately uphold, at 
least in the short term.117 Even though there are about 600 currently-registered 
participants of the Safe Harbor program, this number no doubt only represents a 
tiny fraction of the U.S. entities that process data f"i'om EU organizations. 
Naturally, therefore, it can be safely assumed that even though there are several 
alternative measures available to legitimize transfers of personal data from the 
EU, there arc probably a vast number of U.S. companies that arc choosing, at 
least for now, to comply only with their U.S. obligations and will deal with the 
EU ramifications if and when they arise. At this juncture, where enforcement 
mechanisms arc at a minimum and a company can seemingly fly under the radar, 
incentives to join the Safe Harbor agreement are, temporarily it would seem, at 
a minimum-absent an officious EU-based entity requiring strict adherence by a 
U.S. transferee. However, even this seems unlikely in the faee of a low 
percentage of enforcement among the EU member states. 
Even those companies that have certified under the SHA have apparently 
struggled to meet even the bare minimum commitments that they have made. llx 
Both the Commission Report and the implementation study noted serious 
deficiencies in almost every aspeet of the basie principles of the SHA, with 
virtually no celiified organizations possessing privacy policies that reflect all 
117 Haney & Verska . .I'1i/!!·iI note 14. 
II X S 1.\11 W()RKI~(i [)()Cl~II;; r. \11/)/"(/ note III. at (, X; 1\11'1.1 ~II''J IAII"" S II 'I)) • .I'1I/!I"iI !lote III. at 
10:" 07. 
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seven of the SHA principles. I It) The Commission recommended several courses 
of action to bring organizations into compliance with the principles, including its 
own involvement in some of the proposed processes. 120 These included, for 
example: more rigorous respect for the SHA principles, with greater commitment 
and compliance generally by SHA companies; a more proactive stance on the 
part of the Oepal1ment of Commerce with respect to ensuring viability of public 
privacy policies upon certification; more proactive monitoring by the Federal 
Trade Commission (FTC) in line with the "assiduousness" it had applied to 
spam-related matters; and increased use of power by data protection authorities 
(OPAs) to suspend data transfers, even to Safe Harbor-certified organizations, 
when there is a "substantial likelihood" of noncompliance. lei 
In addition, the Commission Report also independently examined the 
role of all relevant pal1icipants from the U.S. side of the SHA, including the 
Department of Commerce, the FTC, independent resolution bodies, and the EU 
OPA's, and found need for improvement in each area. Ice The Commission was at 
least magnanimous enough to provide suggestions for remedial action to correct 
those dcficiencies. 121 In conclusion, the Report expressed a mix of encoUf-
agel11ent and frustration, but the Commission was sufficiently satisfied to allow 
119 SIMI W()RKI'J<i [)()(I'~II'J I • .Il1lml nolc III. at X. 
120 /d. 
121 !d 
122 Id. at 9 13: .ICC a/so IMI'II'~II'NI,\II()N SII:DY. I'lli'm note III, at 105 II (analY7ing the 
dcticiencies the study identified in the \'arious areas of the SHA implcmentation. and suggcsting mechanisms 
tl1l' impnncmcnt and nolably including clcarer guidancc and policing on the part of thc Dcpartmcnt of 
COlllmcrce). 
123 Id. at 13 14. 
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operations to continue without radical changes, simply suggesting improvement 
across the board. 124 
Despite the positive indications expressed by the Commission, it is 
difficult not to infer from the report some sense of exasperation, not necessarily 
directed towards the United States, but perhaps because it has become a victim 
of its own broad policies. Understanding that the United States is simply one 
jurisdiction to which the Commission inevitably must extend its data protection 
activities-albeit a very impOliant one from a trade perspective, and as an 
exemplary nation for data protection standards-one perception is that the 
Commission may have stretched itself beyond capacity from a global-regulatory, 
or at least an enforcement, perspective. Though it is difTicult to sympathize with 
the EU's plight, let alone empathize with it, one gets the sense that the EU 
desperately wants to elicit the U.S. 's full coopcration as it attempts to enforce its 
legislative policies outside of the traditional boundaries. Looking at that position 
from an objective standpoint, aside from the potential economic meltdown that 
may occur as a result of failure to at least facially cooperate, the proclivities 
associated with the need for national autonomy seem to militate against the U.S. 
ofTering its very best cfTorts to get the EU out of its self-imposed jam. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Perceived from U.S. eyes, concerns have been expressed in a general 
vein regarding the desirability of allowing the EU to dictate the parameters of 
personal data protection regulations in a U .S. context.12~ First and foremost, it has 
124/d 
125 Sec'. e.g .. ;\sscy & Elefthcr;ou. IIII'm IlOtC 4. 
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been assessed that the need for U.S. entity compliance with the Directive's 
principles, whether through the SHA or one of the altematives, could leave U.S. 
citizens feeling like "second class citizens within their own country."12!> 
Furthennore, and perhaps most difficult to rebut, is the argument that by compro-
mising sufficiently to negotiate the SHA, the United States ultimately capitulated 
by giving up some small part of its sovereignty to the EU. In 
Accusations of usurping sovereign powers beyond acceptable levels is 
nothing new to the European Union; it is the very fight it has had with many of 
the individual states in its own CommunityY'~ The key distinction, of course, is 
that those nations explicitly agreed to limit their sovereignty to some extent, even 
if the boundaries of that relinquishment are undefined and are perhaps dynamic. 
But such allegations have rarely been discussed in terms of nations not within the 
European Community, where the institutions of the Community, at least 
ostensibly, have no real authority to mandate any form of regulatory regime. 
Even though intemational law is a somewhat ethereal concept and flows 
to and fro with the tides of the seas that separate the nations, one general 
principle that stands out is that national autonomy should rarely be encroached 
upon by over-reaching intemational neighbors. One practical protection against 
over-reaching is that if nations do not buy into the proposed restrictions on more 
than a cursory level, proposed restrictions simply will not be consistently applied 
or enforced, despite the best efforts or intentions of the promulgator. Such is the 
126 Id. 
In Id. 
12X Sec AR~III.I • supra nole (, and accompanying lex!. 
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case with the EU's data protection directive. Taken to their logical extension, the 
terms of the Directive span every nation, every privacy regime, and every entity 
within thosc nations. Naturally, enforcement of such broad and large-scale 
concepts is ditTicult to police to any great extent. Furthermore, with the EU 
evidencing scant and insufficient ability to accomplish effective regulation, even 
within its own jurisdiction, it seems that at least for the foreseeable future the EU 
has an uphill battle in taking its interventionist approach to fundamental 
freedoms and individual privacy around the globe. Consequently, of all the 
dynamics relating to the Directive that will inevitably play out in the future, 
consistent interpretation and en forcement of the EU's data protection regime 
undoubtedly remain at the hcat1 of its potential success. 
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